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vided as a pool of 4 WBD platelet concentrates, increases the risk of HIV transmission by 2.2 (rather than 4) times; the risk of HCV transmission by 2.7 (rather than 4) times; and the risk of HBV transmission by 3.2 (rather than 4) times ( Figure 1 ) [1] . The model built by the German investigators [1] is of great importance, because it puts to rest concerns that the risk of transmission of HIV, HCV, and/or HBV infection might be increased with single-donor platelets compared with platelet pools because apheresis donors donate more often than whole-blood donors and apheresis components are often split. The fear that an infected plateletapheresis donor(s) who donate(s) many times a year and whose donations are split and transfused to multiple recipients can, by infecting so many recipients, lead to an overall increase in the risk of transmission of a transfusion-transmitted infection (TTI) by apheresis (compared with pooled WBD) platelets has also been allayed by others (Table 1 ) [2, 3] . As the German investigators [1] found, such an infected plateletapheresis donor(s) who donate(s) many times a year and whose donations are split would be responsible for a cluster(s) of TTIs in space and time, but not for an increase in the overall risk of transmission of a specific TTI secondary to transfusion of single-donor versus pooled platelets. The German investigators concluded that, in the event of an increase in the proportion of therapeutic platelet doses transfused as single-donor (rather than pooled) platelets in Germany, the changes in donor demographics (with respect to age, gender, and population size of place of residence) need to be taken into account when considering the risk of infectious disease transmission. If the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge were concentrated in young males from large urban areas, there would probably be no difference in the risk of its transmission between pooled and singledonor platelets because young males from large urban areas (who would be more likely to be infected) are also overrepresented among apheresis (compared with whole-blood) donors. Conversely, if the next agent were concentrated in older residents of small cities and rural areas (or-in the extreme case-in older females residing in small cities and rural areas), the difference in risk between platelet pools and single-donor platelets would be greater than the 4-fold (for pools of 4) or 5-fold (for pools of 5) difference in risk expected from the difference in number of donor exposures [1] . The caution that the German investigators [1] advocate (before we consider making changes to the composition of the donor population) is laudable because-although transfusion-related mortality is currently very low [5] -a novel and fatal TTI could emerge and reproduce the HIV catastrophe of the 1980s [2, 3, 6, 7] . Three fatal TTIs have emerged in the last 30 years: HIV infection, infection with West Nile virus (WNV), and infection with vCJD (variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) prions. What happened in the past can happen again in the future and, if the next agent to emerge were concentrated in young 
. Relative risk (RR) of transmission of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection by transfusion of platelet pools versus single-donor (apheresis) platelets when a platelet pool tantamount to one adult therapeutic platelet dose consists of 4 WBD platelet concentrates (as assumed by the investigators of the Paul-Ehrlich Institute [1]) or of 5 or 6 WBD platelet concentrates (as is the case in the US and many European countries)
. All depicted differences in risk between pooled and single-donor platelet concentrates are statistically significant. The German investigators [1] adjusted the estimate of the incidence of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection in repeat donors for differences in the risk of infection by age group, gender, and population size of place of residence; and also for differences between whole-blood and plateletapheresis donors in age, gender, and population size of place of residence. (For example, 55% of whole-blood donors versus 73% of plateletapheresis donors were male, while males had a 7-fold higher risk of HIV infection, and a 3.6-fold higher risk of HBV infection than females.) After making all these adjustments, the investigators found that the RR of transmission in recipients of pooled versus single-donor platelets was 2.2 (95% CI, 2.1-2.4) for HIV, 2.7 (95% CI, 2.5-3.0) for HCV, and 3.2 (95% CI, 2.8-3.7) for HBV [1] . Here, the figure applies the same adjustments made by the German investigators (for age, gender, and population size of place of residence) to pools of 5 or 6 (rather than 4) WBD platelet concentrates. Pools of at least 5 WBD platelet concentrates are generally necessary for meeting applicable standards for the minimal therapeutic platelet dose, so that-in policy debates-the RR of transmission in recipients of pooled versus single-donor platelets should be considered to be 2.75 for HIV, 3.375 for HCV, and 4.0 for HBV.
males from large urban areas in the manner that HIV was concentrated in young males from large urban areas, a move toward an all-apheresis platelet supply would not lessen the risk of transmission of the next major pathogen through platelet transfusion. The next major TTI to emerge is the cardinal threat to transfusion safety today, because a novel "HIV-like" pathogen could cause more deaths than TRALI (transfusionrelated acute lung injury), TAS (transfusion-associated sepsis secondary to transfusion of a blood component contaminated with bacteria), and hemolytic transfusion reactions combined [3] . A novel "HIV-like" pathogen need not be a virus, however, and it need not be transmitted sexually. All it need have to reproduce the HIV catastrophe of the 1980s is a long asymptomatic phase during which donors will be making infectious donations.
Concerning the attribute of a chronic infection with prolonged pathogenemia, the closest to an "HIV-like" pathogen to emerge in the last 30 years have been the vCJD prions. It is also possible that the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen could be "WNV-like", that is, it could cause acute infection associated with a short and self-limiting period of pathogenemia. The micro- [8] [9] [10] . Therefore, unlike the "traditional" transfusion-transmitted viruses (HIV, HCV, and HBV), which have well-described associations with particular age groups, male versus female gender, and residence in large cities and metropolitan areas versus small cities and rural areas, the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge cannot be expected to be associated with any particular age group, or with male (versus female) gender, or with residence in large cities and metropolitan areas (versus small cities and rural areas). Based on the experience accumulated over the last 30 years, policymakers must take a neutral position and assume that all blood donors could be equally at risk of contracting and transmitting the next pathogen, because neither the microbiologic characteristics nor the transmission mode of that agent can be predicted. Importantly, policy-makers should take into account the possibility that the accumulation of the next agent in the blood-donor population may have already commenced. Thus, when it comes to modeling the relative risk (RR) of transmission of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future by pooled WBD versus single-donor platelets, the adjustments made by the German investigators [1] (and which were most appropriate for modeling the residual risk of HIV, HCV, and HBV) must be removed from the model [1] , because the epidemiology of the next pathogen is unknown. If the next pathogen turns out to be "HIV-like" in the sense of being overly concentrated in young males residing in large cities and metropolitan areas, the German investigators [1] correctly predict that the overrepresentation of young males from large cities and metropolitan areas among plateletapheresis (versus whole-blood) donors could wipe out the difference in risk between pooled WBD versus single-donor platelets (so that platelet pools and apheresis platelets could end up having the same risk of transmitting the novel pathogen to transfusion recipients). There is no reason, however, to a priori consider that the next pathogen will be "HIV-like" in the sense of being overly concentrated in young males residing in large urban areas. As already discussed, the next pathogen could be "HIV-like" in the same way that the vCJD prions are "HIV-like": that is, associated with a long asymptomatic phase while being foodborne (rather than sexually transmitted). Alternatively, the next agent could be vector-borne or even airborne, showing little or no predilection for (or conceivably even showing aversion towards) young males residing in large urban areas.
Accordingly, when it comes to modeling the RR of transmission of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen by pooled WBD versus single-donor platelets, the only determinant of the RR (before the epidemicologic characteristics of the next pathogen become known) is the number of donor exposures, that is, the number of WBD concentrates that make up a therapeutic platelet dose. Although the precise calculation of the RR is complex and involves conditional probabilities, the number of WBD concentrates in the pool makes for a very good approximation of the actual RR [2, 3] . If the pools consist of 5 WBD concentrates (as is the case, on average, in the US [4] ), policy-makers should assume that platelet pools have a 5 times higher risk of transmission of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen compared with single-donor (apheresis) platelets (Table 1 and Figure 2 Figure 1 ). This is the actual RR of transmission, by pools versus single-donor concentrates, of these "traditional" transfusion-transmitted viruses in Germany today. Beyond this actual risk, there is the "theoretical" risk of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future. Although this risk is "theoreticcal", it could cause a major catastrophe should it materialize, potentially resulting in more deaths than TRALI, TAS, and hemolytic transfusion reactions combined when transfusions of all blood components are considered, and even in a number of deaths comparable to half the total number of annual deaths from TRALI, TAS, and hemolytic transfusion reactions combined when transfusions of platelet pools alone are considered (Figure 2 ) [3] . If (or when) such a pathogen emerges, we know from the model of the German investigators [1] that the RR could be as low as ≤1.0 (if the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen were "HIV-like" in the sense of being overly concentrated in young males residing in large urban areas), in which case the dire predictions of Figure 2 would not materialize. We also know, however, that the RR could be as high as 5.0 (for pools of 5) or 4.0 (for pools of 4) if no a priori assump- tions were made about the actual epidemiology of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future [2, 3, 6, 7] . In that case, transfusion recipients would suffer as predicted in Figure 2 , that is, they would suffer the full brunt of the policy-makers' failure to act at the appropriate time. Now that the RKI/PEI model [1] has found that pooled WBD and single-donor platelets differ in the risk of transmission of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection, and potentially also in the risk of transmission of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future, the question that arises is whether a specific policy action(s) is mandated by the findings of the model. An immediate policy action could be the revision of the German guidelines for hemotherapy [13] Adverse events captured by hemovigilance systems depend on whether a particular adverse event caused by a transfusion was suspected of being, investigated as possibly being, and/or deemed to be transfusion-related on the basis of the criteria employed locally for the diagnosis of each transfusion complication. Whether transfusion is considered as the possible cause of an adverse event varies with the medical and nursing staff awareness of transfusion complications at each particular clinical setting, as well as with local culture, resources, and logistics vis-à-vis the extent of investigation and the reporting of such adverse events along the designated channels of the hemovigilance system. Thus, hemovigilance systems tend to greatly underestimate the incidence of transfusion-related adverse events. When TRALI was identified by a passive surveillance system relying on the Canadian Consensus Criteria [24] for making the diagnosis, the frequency of TRALI cases was in the range of 1 per 16,000 units of transfused plasma, 1 per 43,000 units of transfused platelets and 1 per 44,000 units of transfused red blood cells [25] . When TRALI was identified by a prospective observational study also employing the Canadian Consensus Criteria [24] for making the diagnosis in an intensive-care unit, 1 (8.2%) of 12 critically ill patients was reported to develop TRALI [26] . In the latter case [26] , patients had generally received multiple blood components (red blood cells, plasma, and/or platelets) within 6 hours of developing acute lung injury (ALI) which met the definition of TRALI. [24] . Critically-ill patients (with sepsis, trauma, and other factors that may represent the "first hit" in the "two-hit" hypothesis of TRALI pathogenesis [27] ) may have a lower threshold for TRALI than does the average transfusion recipient, so that they are more prone than average to develop TRALI. Some cases of ALI occurring in close proximity to a transfusion were also probably misdiagnosed as TRALI in this prospective observational study [26] . The > 1,000-fold difference in the reported incidence of TRALI between the passive surveillance [25] and the prospective observational study [26] is therefore partly due to the patient factors. It is undoubtedly also due, however, to the difference in study design (passive surveillance versus observational) and the tendency of the passive surveillance approach to greatly underestimate the incidence of transfusion-related adverse events.
When awareness of transfusion complications increases, or when resources are expended to detect transfusion complications, the reporting of transfusion complications to hemovigilance systems increases. Both of these conditions were satisfied, before the implementation of bacterial detection in platelets, at the Johns Hopkins Hospital (Baltimore, Maryland, US). Over 12 years, Ness et al. [14] had implemented a system of prospective monitoring, whereby all febrile reactions to platelets were assessed by culture. Under these conditions, the investigators observed a TAS risk of 1 per 3,000 platelet pools versus 1 per 15,000 apheresis platelets [14] . A virtually identical risk (1 per 2,282 platelet pools in 2000 and 1 per 4,149 platelet pools in 2001) was observed during the first 2 years of the Quebec hemovigilance program, which relied on hospitals that cultured 40.4% to 51.6% of platelet pools implicated in transfusion reactions and that were staffed with transfusion officers [28] . In contrast, from 1994 to 1998, the French hemovigilance system-probably the most comprehensive passive surveillance system that entailed mandatory reporting-observed a risk of TAS secondary to platelet transfusion of only 1 per 13,000 platelet pools [29] . The reported risk was far lower in the UK hemovigilance program [30, 31] . Thus, surveillance systems grossly underestimate the risk of even acute adverse events following transfusion, such as TRALI or TAS. Surveillance systems are not designed to detect adverse events that do not occur in close proximity to the transfusion, such as transfusiontransmitted infections that do not cause clinical signs or symptoms until months or years after the transfusion. Such is the case with HIV, HCV, and HBV infection, of which several cases are expected to occur every year in the US based on the findings of the current incidence/ window-period model [32] , but hardly any are reported. Even after the implementation of testing for HIV and HCV RNA, at least 10 transmissions of HIV and 10 transmissions of HCV should occur annually in the US (given a risk of transmission for HIV of 1 per 2.135 million donations and a risk of transmission for HCV of 1 per 1.935 million donations [32] ). Yet, only 11 (3.6%) of 307 transfusion-related deaths reported to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from 2005 through 2010 had been due to a TTI other than TAS [5] -with none of these 11 deaths being due to HIV, HCV, or HBV infection. In fact, surveillance systems are likely to miss even acute transfusion-transmitted infections, as has been demonstrated for TAS [33] , and as was likely the case with some WNV infections occurring in New York in the summer of 1999 (when no transfusion-transmitted cases were reported in the course of the first WNV epidemic in North America), as well as with some dengue fever virus (DFV) infections occurring in endemic areas over many decades. The effectiveness of the current surveillance systems may thus be low, particularly at the point of recognition of events by physicians and their subsequent reporting to transfusion services [34] . As a result, the transmission of DFV through transfusion had gone undetected until recently [35, 36] . The recording by the UK SHOT system of deaths from transfusion-acquired vCJD is due to the active surveillance efforts made in the UK to identify cases of transmission of vCJD through transfusion. The reporting of 5 and 2 HIV, HCV, or HBV infections [19, 20] attributed, respectively, to apheresis versus pooled platelets in 1997-2010 in Germany followed a considerable public debate that had taken place in 2011 [37] about the relative safety of pooled versus apheresis platelet components. The official German hemovigilance data for 1997-2010 [21] [22] [23] instead reported 6 (0 HIV, 2 HCV, and 4 HBV) infections from apheresis platelets and 1 (0 HIV, 1 HCV, and 0 HBV) infection from platelet pools (see Table 7 on page 26 of the 2010 hemovigilance report [21] ). More specifically, the hemovigilance data for 2009 [22] (published on 3/30/ 2011; Table 3 on page 24). The change in the number of HIV, HCV, and HBV transmissions (5 versus 2 as opposed to 6 versus 1) ascribed to apheresis versus pooled platelets after the 2011 public controversy [37] reflected the uncertainty (owing to the limitations of any surveillance system in capturing precise information) about the type of platelet component from which the TTIs attributed to platelet transfusion had arisen. In Germany, there is also a systematic difference between the clinical settings in which different platelet components are transfused. Platelet pools are primarily distributed by the Red Cross Blood Services to community hospitals. Apheresis platelets are primarily collected by university-hospital blood banks (or other hospital blood banks operated by large hospitals in large cities) and are transfused locally. If community hospitals transfuse platelets predominantly to patients with acute bleeding who are less likely to survive the transfusion (or to return for follow-up) than patients receiving platelets in the hematology and surgery units of university hospitals, we would expect many fewer patients from community hospitals (who receive platelet pools) than patients from university hospitals (who receive apheresis platelets) to be detected by the surveillance systems with transfusion-acquired HIV, HCV, or HBV infection. This could be because fewer of the former (than the latter) patients survive the transfusion or return for follow-up, or because (compared with the university-hospital setting) a transfusion-transmitted chronic infection is less likely to be diagnosed in the community-hospital setting as being transfusion-acquired, and/or to be reported along the channels of the surveillance system. Review of the overall versus the platelet pool-specific German surveillance data in 1997-2010 [21] [22] [23] lends credence to this hypothesis. On average over this period, there were about 4 to 4.5 million whole-blood donations annually in Germany. Approximately 20% to 25% of these whole-blood donations (or some 1 million donations annually) were used to produce the 220,000 platelet doses provided as pools of 4 or 5 WBD concentrates. Over 14 years (1997 Over 14 years ( -2010 , approximately 56 to 58 million whole-blood donations engendered 16 HBV transmissions with packed red blood cells that were detected and reported along the channels of the surveillance system. Up to 4 HBV transmissions would be likely expected to occur from platelet pools (if 20% to 25% of all whole-blood donations were used for making pools), but no HBV transmission was detected and reported [21] . Similarly, since 8 HCV transmissions were reported from 56 to 58 million donations of packed red blood cells in 1997-2010, 2 HCV transmissions would be expected from platelet pools, but only 1 was detected and reported [21] . Although these differences could certainly have occurred by chance, they may also reflect the fact that platelet pools are transfused specifically at community hospitals, while the other components made from whole-blood donations are transfused at either university or community hospitals. Finally, donors of apheresis platelets are monitored intensively and over a long time for development of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection. Should an incident TTI be detected in an apheresis donor, lookback will be promptly initiated and potentially identify a case(s) of transfusion-transmitted infection that will be recorded by the surveillance system. This is less likely to happen with whole-blood donors who do not donate as frequently (or may not return to donate or may not notify the blood center of their diagnosis if they are diagnosed with HIV, HCV, or HBV infection in the community).
The reduction in risk is not of a magnitude sufficient to justify a policy intervention(s)
The incidence/window-period model (as used by the German investigators [1] ) assumes that transfusiontransmitted viral infections arise because of donations made during the preseroconvesion window period, considering that infections secondary to "immunosilent" infections in donors, infections secondary to variant viral strains, and infections secondary to laboratory errors (which are not taken into account by the model) are exceedingly rare [38] . In the early 1990s, during the infectious window period a donor was viremic, but did not yet have detectable HIV-1/2 antibody, HCV antibody, or HBsAg (hepatitis B surface antigen). When these infectious disease markers were used to detect incident infection, the mean length of the infectious window period was 22 days for HIV, 82 days for HCV, and 59 days for HBV [38] . The length of the window period could be reduced by the implementation of an additional test(s) for each transfusion-transmitted virus [38] , and a considerable policy debate arose in the mid-1990s as to whether the reduction in risk made possible by the introduction of each additional screening assay was of a magnitude sufficient to justify the policy intervention. Table 2 ) was deemed to be greater than the anticipated benefit from testing for HIV RNA (RR of 2.0 and projected yield of 12). Although many US blood suppliers are testing blood donors for HBV DNA, the US FDA did not mandate that all US blood donors be screened for HBV DNA.
Thus, blood components screened only for anti-HIV-1/2 (or even anti-HIV-1/2 plus HIV-1 p24 antigen) are less safe than blood components screened for both anti-HIV-1/2 and HIV-1 RNA. This is not reflected merely in the labeling of the components (as a warning to transfusing clinicians), but-more importantly-in the prohibition of the use of components screened only for anti-HIV-1/2 (or anti-HIV-1/2 plus HIV-1 p24 antigen) and not screened for HIV-1 RNA as well. Similarly, blood components screened only for anti-HCV are less safe than blood components screened for both anti-HCV and HCV RNA. This is not reflected merely in the labeling of the components, but in the prohibition of the use of components screened only for anti-HCV (and not screened for HCV RNA as well). Based on the precedent of these policy decisions made in the 1990s, and in the absence of a consideration of impending implementation of PR (discussed in the next section), pooled platelets must be considered less safe than apheresis platelets, because they have a 2.2-fold higher risk for pools of 4 (or a 2.75-fold higher risk for pools of 5) of transmitting HIV infection to transfusion recipients; and a 2.7-fold higher risk for pools of 4 (or a 3.375-fold higher risk for pools of 5) of transmitting HCV infection to transfusion recipients. The RR for pooled versus apheresis platelets in the case of HIV (2.2 or 2.75) exceeds the RR that led to the introduction of screening for HIV-1 p24 antigen (1.375) or HIV-1 RNA [38] . The projected yield estimates are based on the findings of the incidence/window-period model [38] and not on surveillance data. They were not reproduced (nor were they expected at the time to be reproduced) by empirical evidence of actual transfusion-transmitted infections. Even so, the number of infectious donations intercepted annually is high in the [1] . The absolute number of 1 to 2 HIV-, HCV-, or HBV-infectious platelet doses intercepted annually in Germany is much smaller than the projected yield (Table 2 ) from the implementation of screening for HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA in the 1990s. The replacement of platelet pools by an all-apheresis platelet supply, however, becomes proportional (in terms of yield) to the introduction of screening for HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA in the 1990s when we also consider the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future. If this pathogen is "HIV-like" in the sense of having a prolonged period of asymptomatic pathogenemia during which donors will be making infectious donations, and if it attains a prevalence of 1 per 10,000 German donors during the year preceding the timely implementation of blood-donor screening for the new pathogen, the implementation of an all-apheresis platelet supply in Germany (before the new agent starts accumulating in the blood donor population) should prevent 22 transmissions of the new pathogen during the year preceding the introduction of testing. Similarly to the calculations shown in Table 1 , the 220,000 platelet doses currently transfused as pools in Germany would result in 22 recipient infections if the new pathogen attained a prevalence of 1 per 10,000 donors and Germany were to move to an all-apheresis platelet supply prior to the emergence of the new agent. If, however, the current situation of transfusing pools were perpetuated, and pools of 5 WBD concentrates were used to ensure an adequate platelet dose, the transfusion of 220,000 platelet pools would result in 110 recipient infections. Therefore, the move to an all-apheresis platelet supply could prevent 88 transmissions of the next "HIV-like" pathogen during the year preceding the implementation of testing for the new pathogen. More importantly perhaps, if 31.5% of platelet transfusion recipients survive for 10 years after receipt of the platelet transfusion (as was the case in the only study of the length of survival of transfusion recipients that presented 10-year follow-up and reported separately on the survival of recipients of platelet transfusion [12] ), the move to an all-apheresis platelet supply could prevent 28 deaths that would otherwise result from a platelet transfusion received in the year preceding the implementation of testing for the new pathogen.
Even if the new pathogen is "WNV-like", some 15 transmissions could be prevented, again making the absolute number of TTI cases prevented by an all-apheresis platelet supply similar to the absolute number of HIV and HCV infections prevented in the 1990s thanks to the implementation of screening for HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA. Such is the expected benefit from an all-apheresis platelet supply when no a priori assumptions are made about the epidemiology and/or microbiologic characteristics of the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future. Although the risk confronted is "theoretical", a 5-fold reduction in the magnitude of the risk can be reasonably achieved [3, 40] . It is indeed logistically feasible to move toward an all-apheresis platelet supply without facing a risk of non-availability of needed platelet components; the move by US blood suppliers from pooled to single-donor platelets in order to comply with the 2004 mandate for bacterial screening of platelet components [41] has demonstrated the feasibility of such an endeavor. A move toward an all-apheresis platelet supply is thus not associated with any risk to patients and (if donation frequency is not increased before further studies are completed [42] [43] [44] ), it is also not associated with any risk to donors ( Figure 3 ) [45] .
In contrast to what the historical literature on donor reactions reviewed by Schrezenmeier and Seifried [46] has indicated, this modern approach to meeting all of a country's platelet transfusion needs through apheresis should not be associated with any increase in moderate and severe donor reactions in Germany, as it has not been associated with any increase in moderate and severe donor reactions in the US (Figure 3 ) [45] . On the contrary, the rate of moderate and severe donor reactions should decrease with an all-apheresis platelet supply (as has been the case in the US [45] ) if plateletapheresis is performed with the cell separators used today and at the hands of trained personnel who have accumulated significant experience with the performance of the procedure. Equally importantly, if an all-apheresis platelet supply becomes part of the patient-centric paradigm of clinical transfusion practice for the 21 st century (which should replace the still-prevailing componentcentric paradigm of clinical transfusion practice for the 20 th century [3] ; see Discussion section), multicomponent apheresis would meet all transfusion needs of both US and German patients by subjecting to the rare risks of donation a number of donors that will not exceed the number of donors bled today to produce the same number of red-blood-cell, platelet, and plasma components from whole blood donations [47] . This is because any country with a North-American/Western European healthcare system requires several times more therapeutic doses of red blood cells than of plasma or platelets to meet the needs of all its transfusion recipients [4] . Therefore, since the total number of donors to be subjected to multicomponent-apheresis donation in the future will not exceed the total number of donors subjected to whole-blood donation today, Schrezenmeier and Seifreid's argument (that any donor reactions to plateletapheresis collections represent "additional" donor reactions that cannot be justified because these plateletapheresis components could have been provided by pooling already-available buffy coats [46] ) is refuted for the simple reason that the all-apheresis platelet supply envisioned for the 21 st century [3] will not entail the "additional" plateletapheresis collections [47] that Schrezenmeier and Seifreid presumed based on their retrospective consideration of donation methods and transfusion practices of the 20 th century. As already stated, the next "HIV-like" pathogen to emerge need not be a virus and it need not be transmitted sexually; the closest to an "HIV-like" pathogen to emerge in the last 30 years have been the vCJD prions. If it is reasonable to anticipate that a novel HIVlike pathogen could emerge, we encounter the same trade-off as do policy-makers in the environmental sector: that is, a trade-off between the economic cost of introducing a precautionary measure and the potential health benefits that the proposed measure might provide [48, 49] . The precautionary principle-enshrined in European Union law [50] -states that, when a purported risk represents a threat of "serious or irreversible damage" (as a fatal transfusion-acquired disease would do), complete evidence of risk does not have to exist to justify the institution of measures to protect individuals and society from that risk. If a new pathogen with "unpredictable" characteristics (along the lines of the vCJD prions) were to emerge in the future, and/or if PR of platelets were not ripe for implementation (as considered in the next section), there is no alternative to the reduction in the number of donor exposures (that an allapheresis platelet supply would confer) for containing an epidemic of platelet transfusion-acquired disease.
Mutations are frequent in RNA viruses (such as HIV and HCV), and when mutations result in aminoacid substitutions, the antigenicity of the virus may be affected, and the antibody produced by the host may not crossreact adequately with the antigens used for capture in screening assays [51] . In addition to such false-negative antibody screening test results, HIV-1 RNA false-negative screening assay results are possible if a mutation occurs in the single RNA region targeted by a (singletarget) RNA screening assay [52] . Currently in Germany, HIV-1 RNA tests that amplify a single target region of the HIV-1 RNA genome, and that detect a minimum of 10,000 viral copies/milliliter, meet the PEI requirements for HIV-1 RNA screening of blood donors [52] . Between 2007 and 2010, the PaulEhrlich Institute asked German blood operators to perform investigations of samples suspected of producing false-negative HIV-1 RNA test results. Based on the responses received from the blood operators, 17 cases of false-negative HIV-1 RNA assay results (in donors with documented HIV infection) were observed between 2007 and 2010 [52] . In 14 cases, the HIV-1/2 antibody test results had been positive, and the donations were thus intercepted. In 3 cases, however, the HIV-1/2 antibody test results were negative, and the units were transfused, resulting in 2 documented cases of HIV transmission by transfusion [52, 53] . Further investigation showed that the false-negative HIV-1 RNA assay results were due to HIV-1 viral strains in which the (single) HIV-1 RNA region targeted by the employed HIV-1 RNA test was mutated, so that this RNA region was either under-recognized or not recognized at all by the HIV-1 RNA assay [52, 53] . Based on these active-surveillance data, the Paul-Ehrlich Institute estimated the risk of HIV transmission (secondary to mutations of the single RNA region targeted by the HIV-1 RNA tests) to be 1 per 9.64 million donations [52] , or approximately 1 infectious donation made every 2 years. This risk of HIV transmission is comparable to the absolute increase in the risk from platelet pools for HIV, HCV, and HBV transmission combined (1 to 2 HIV-, HCV-, or HBV-infectious platelet doses annually). Appropriately, the Paul-Ehrlich Institute intervened to interrupt this risk of HIV transmission by transfusion, and it determined that-within 30 months of the initial communication [52] -German blood operators should implement "dual-target" RNA screening assays (i.e., assays that target two separate regions of the HIV-1 RNA genome for amplification); or implement alternate RNA tests that afford recipients the same level of protection as the "dual-target" RNA screening tests do [52] . Given this precedent [52] , the Paul-Ehrlich Institute should intervene in the same manner to intercept the 1 to 2 HIV, HCV-, or HBV-infectious platelet doses annually that are assumed to occur based on the findings of the RKI/ PEI mathematical model [1] . Even if the implementation of "dual-target" HIV-1 RNA screening tests was deemed to be virtually cost-neutral [52] , whereas the move toward an all-apheresis platelet supply is regarded as costly, policy-makers should consider that the move toward an all-apheresis platelet supply will also reduce the risk of transmission of the next major transfusiontransmitted pathogen(s) to emerge in the future; whereas no such benefit will be conferred by the implementation of "dual-target" HIV-1 RNA screening assays by January 1, 2015.
The impending implementation of pathogen reduction of platelets will eliminate any difference in the risk of transfusion-transmitted infections between platelet pools and single-donor platelets
If PR of platelets were ripe for implementation (i.e., demonstrated to be free of possible adverse effects introduced by the PR process, which perhaps equal or exceed the benefit derived from the prevention of infectious-disease transmission), PR of platelets could indeed eliminate the residual risk of transmission of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection, as well as prevent transfusion transmission of emerging pathogens containing nucleic acids. With the same proviso, PR of platelets could prevent the very important transfusion risk of TAS secondary to bacterial contamination of platelet components. PR could not protect from novel agents not containing nucleic acids (along the lines of the vCJD prions), but the extent of protection afforded by PR vis-à-vis the traditional (nucleic-acid-based) pathogens would be of a magnitude sufficient to recommend its implementation [6, 7, 54] . The recommendation for the use of PR [54] , however, was made (and PR systems for platelets were approved in Europe as early as 2006) before the randomized controlled trial (RCT) of Kerkoffs et al. [55] reported a statistically significant (p < 0.05) increase in the risk of bleeding between recipients of pathogen-reduced (versus non-pathogen-reduced) platelets; and before a metaanalysis [56] of all available RCTs comparing the risk of bleeding between recipients of pathogen-reduced ver- sus non-pathogen-reduced platelets [55, [57] [58] [59] [60] demonstrated that the findings of Kerkhoffs et al. [55] were not inconsistent with the results of the earlier RCTs [57] [58] [59] [60] .
The recommendation for the use of PR [54] was also made before platelets were known to contain significant amounts of functionally-important nucleic acids. We now know that platelets retain a diverse transcriptome from their megakaryocytic precursors [61] , so that up to one-third of all human genes are present in platelet mRNAs [62] [63] [64] [65] . Platelets make use of their mRNAs to template de novo protein synthesis both in the circulation and during platelet storage in the blood bank [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] . Platelets also contain an especially abundant and diverse array of microRNAs-that is, small, 19-to 24-nucleotide-long, non-coding RNA species-and indeed a functioning microRNA pathway that regulates mRNAs and gene transcription and may thus affect platelet protein translation and platelet function [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] .
Given the increase in bleeding complications reported in recipients of pathogen-reduced (versus non-pathogen-reduced) platelets by Kerkhoffs et al. [55] and by the meta-analysis of all RCTs [56] , PR might impair the function of all treated platelets in addition to causing the known loss of a proportion of the treated platelets [55, 56] . More specifically, PR could reduce the platelet content of microRNAs by inhibiting microRNA synthesis through crosslinking of their double-stranded precursors (if PR targeted nucleic acids as short as these double-stranded precursors) [77] . Alternatively, the cellular perturbation caused by PR might cause release of microRNAs from platelets, either directly into the supernatant or inside microvesicles. Either way, there could be reduced microRNA content of the PR-treated platelets, impaired protein synthesis during their storage in the blood bank, and impairment of their function which could explain the increased bleeding observed in recipients of treated (versus untreated) platelets [55, 56] , despite the compensatory platelet transfusions given to make up for the platelet losses known to be caused by PR (Figure 4) . Two meta-analyses [56, 78] by Vamvakas (one including the single Mirasol [60] trial and one limited to the Intercept studies [55, [57] [58] [59] 79] ), and one meta-analysis [80] of the Intercept RCTs [55, 57, 59, 79, 81] by Cid et al., have reached discrepant conclusions as to whether PR increases the risk of bleeding complications in settings in which patients receiving pathogen-reduced platelets also receive prophylactically compensatory platelet transfusions to make up for the platelet losses known to be caused by PR (and thus maintain a platelet count of at least 10,000/µL). The discrepancy in the conclusions reached by the two groups is remarkable, because the meta-analysis by Cid et al. [80] and the second meta-analysis by Vamvakas [78] integrated the results of the same 5 Intercept RCTs [55, [57] [58] [59] 79, 81] . Vamvakas [78] separately integrated the reported results on all bleeding (World Health Organization [WHO] or National Cancer Institute Common Toxicity Criteria [CTC] bleeding grades 1 through 4), on clinically significant bleeding (WHO or CTC bleeding grades 2 through 4), and on severe bleeding (i.e., bleeding categorized as such by the authors of the RCT or bleeding of WHO or CTC grades 3 and 4). The metaanalysis thus integrated clinically homogeneous outcome measures and each of the three performed analyses was correspondingly statistically homogeneous. There was a statistically significant (p < 0.05) increase in clinically significant bleeding across the studies in association with PR, albeit not in all bleeding or severe bleeding ( Figure 5 ). Concerning the definition of severe bleeding, briefly, grade 1 bleeding encompasses mild bleeding for which no intervention is needed; grade 2 bleeding encompasses symptomatic bleeding for which some intervention (although not transfusion) is needed; grade 3 bleeding requires transfusion or other intervention; and grade 4 bleeding is catastrophic. Cid et al. [80] presented only a single integration of the bleeding complications presented in the published RCTs [55, 57, 59, 79, 81] , in which they combined the results on grade 2 bleeding from the largest (SPRINT) trial [81] with the results on all bleeding from 3 other RCTs [55, 57, 59] . Thus, symptomatic bleeding for which some intervention (although not transfusion) was needed in the largest RCT [81] (which enrolled more than half of the total number of patients available for meta-analysis) was combined with all bleeding (i.e., mild bleeding for which no intervention is needed, symptomatic bleeding for which some intervention is needed, bleeding requiring transfusion or other intervention, as well as catastrophic bleeding) in 3 other studies [55, 57, 59] . This combination of clinically heterogeneous outcome measures (i.e., grade 2 bleeding in the SPRINT trial [81] versus grade 1 through grade 4 bleeding in 3 other RCTs [55, [57] [58] [59] ) suggested no difference in bleeding between recipients of pathogen-reduced versus non-pathogen-reduced platelets ( Figure 6 ). However, whether such a combination of clinically heterogeneous outcome measures has any biologic meaning or clinical relevance is questionable. There have been two reports of the bleeding complications observed in the large SPRINT trial [58, 81] . The initial report [81] (on which Cid et al. [80] relied) made daily, per-protocol assessments of bleeding by blinded assessors, on the WHO scale and during only the period of platelet transfusion support. The expanded safety analysis [58] (on which Vamvakas [78] relied) compiled spontaneous reports of bleeding by blinded on-site personnel, on the CTC scale and during both the period of platelet transfusion support and an ensuing surveillance period (i.e., a period of observation similar to that used in the other RCTs). The expanded safety analysis [58] reported separately on grade 1, grade 2, grade 3, and grade 4 bleeding. The initial report [81] reported only on grade 2, grade 3, and grade 4 bleeding, while it designated only grade 2 bleeding as the study's primary outcome, leading Cid et al. [80] to integrate solely the SPRINT trial results on grade 2 bleeding in their metaanalysis. Although the initial report reflected the experimental design, the expanded safety analysis [58] was conducted because of concerns voiced about the analysis of adverse events as presented in the initial report [81] . An analysis of the differences in the frequency of bleeding complications presented in the two reports of the SPRINT trial [58, 81] (included as Figure 1 in Vamvakas' meta-analysis [78] ) accounts for the difference in the conclusions reached by Vamvakas [78] and by Cid et al. [80] . Before PR can be considered ready for implementation, we must investigate whether PR reduces the level of platelet microRNAs, thereby potentially impairing platelet function and causing increased bleeding in recipients ( Figure 4 ). Further RCTs are also needed to resolve this question [82] , and an RCT of the Mirasol system is currently under way in the Netherlands and Canada. It is possible that these pending studies will show no effect of PR on the level of platelet microRNAs or no increase in bleeding or other adverse effects secondary to PR, establishing the safety of PR and making PR ready for implementation. Alternatively, these studies may show that the implementation of PR systems for platelets (which are based on chemically-induced crosslinking of nucleic acids) is inappropriate, because platelets contain significant amounts of functionally-important nucleic acids which are reduced by PR, leading to an impairment of platelet function in PR-treated platelets.
DISCUSSION
Recently, the Robert Koch Institute and the Paul-Ehrlich Institute presented the first mathematical model finding a statistically significant increase in the risk of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection by platelet transfusion when pools of 4 WBD concentrates, rather than 1 single-donor (apheresis) component, are used to provide one adult therapeutic platelet dose [1] . The relative increase in the risk of transmission of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection secondary to receipt of a platelet pool rather than a single-donor platelet component (RR of 2.2 or 2.75 for HIV, 2.7 or 3.375 for HCV, and 3.2 or 4.0 for HBV, with pools of 4 or 5 WBD concentrates, respectively- Figure 1 ) is similar to the relative increase in risk secondary to receipt of a unit not screened for HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA (in addition to the antibody screening tests) versus receipt of a unit fully screened by the tests required by regulators today. The absolute increase in the risk from pools (number of HIV, HCV, and HBV transmissions that could be prevented annually if the platelet pools were replaced by apheresis platelets) is much smaller than the projected yield (Table 2 ) from the implementation of screening for HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA in the 1990s. The replacement of platelet pools by an all-apheresis platelet supply, however, becomes proportional in terms of yield to the introduction of screening for HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA in the 1990s when we also consider the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future. Although the replacement of platelet pools by an all-apheresis platelet supply can be expected to intercept only 1 to 2 HIV-, HCV-, or HBV-infectious platelet doses annually, it could prevent up to 88 transmissions of the next "HIV-like" pathogen to emerge in the future during the year preceding the implementation of testing of the new pathogen. (Such would be the case if the new pathogen attained a prevalence of 1 per 10,000 donors and no a priori assumptions were made about the epidemiology and/or microbiologic characteristics of the new pathogen.) Both the reduction in risk thanks to the implementation of additional screening assays debated in the 1990s and the reduction in risk thanks to the implementation of an all-apheresis platelet supply debated presently have been based on mathematical models using the incidence/window-period method. This is the only appropriate basis for making policy decisions concerning measures to reduce or prevent disease transmission by transfusion, because surveillance data grossly underestimate the incidence of even acute adverse transfusion events, and they are not designed to capture chronic infections contracted by transfusion and becoming manifest only months or years following the transfusion. When rare events (such as TTIs) are recorded by surveillance systems, there is certainty about the existence of risk, although the magnitude of the risk cannot be determined from the surveillance data. Risk-management action should be taken in the absence of certainty about risk (such as would be secured from surveillance data); mathematical models are necessary for quantifying the risk of rare events (such as TTIs) and for guiding the risk-management action (so that the risk-management action can be both proactive and proportionate to the magnitude of the risk) [83] . The projected yield shown in Table 2 (number of HIVor HCV-infectious donations intercepted annually thanks to the implementation of HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA screening) was not recorded by either US or German surveillance systems. Nonetheless, the figure derived from the incidence/window-period model [38] at that time (Table 2) was the best available estimate of the expected benefit from the introduction of HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA screening, and these additional screening tests were implemented in both the US and Germany. Their introduction prevented (since the late 1990s) many cases of transfusion-acquired HIV or HCV infection that would not have been captured by our surveillance systems had they been permitted to occur. Although implementation of PR of platelets would eliminate the difference in the risk of transmission of HIV, HCV, and HBV infection between platelet pools and single-donor platelets, the hitherto-developed PR systems for platelets are not ready for implementation. The recommendation for the use of these PR systems [54] (which are based on chemically-induced crosslinking of nucleic acids) was made before the RCT of Kerkhoffs et al. [55] found a statistically significant increase in the risk of bleeding between recipients of pathogen-reduced (versus non-pathogen-reduced) platelets; and before platelets were known to contain significant amounts of functionally-important nucleic acids. Currently, further studies are required to determine whether PR is associated with increased bleeding and/or other adverse effects [82] . Until the safety or PR is established, it is inappropriate to transfuse pathogen-reduced platelets outside the setting of an RCT. The immediate benefit from PR would be the prevention of ≥ 90% cases of TAS (i.e., of all cases of TAS except for the very rare cases secondary to sporeforming bacteria). However, we now have an alternative solution for this major transfusion risk (despite the logistic difficulties involved): a second bacteria detection test performed at the time of issue of the component, which can prevent 70% to 90% of cases of TAS [84, 85] . Nonetheless, PR can prevent both TAS and infection with the next major transfusion-transmitted pathogen to emerge in the future (if the next agent contains nucleic acids). Thus, if shown to be safe, PR should replace the bacteria detection tests to protect against both TAS and the next major TTI to emerge in the future. When the time for the implementation of PR comes, however, PR should be performed on an all-apheresis platelet supply ( Table 3) . The time for converting to an all-apheresis supply is now, since: 1) an all-apheresis supply confers a benefit of sufficient magnitude to justify this policy decision based on the precedent of implementing HIV-1 RNA and HCV RNA screening in the 1990s (Table 2) ; and 2) an all-apheresis platelet supply is not associated with any risk to either patients or donors (Figure 3 ) [45] if donation frequency does not increase [42] [43] [44] . The time for introducing PR will be when (or if) the safety of PR is established. Importantly, the findings of the on-going or planned studies of the safety of PR cannot be predicted. Therefore, the implementation of an all-aphere- sis platelet supply in Germany should not be further postponed based on the assumption that the on-going or planned studies of the safety of PR are expected to vindicate the technology. Even if PR is eventually implemented, platelet transfusion will be safer if PR is performed on an all-apheresis platelet supply rather than on platelet pools. This is because: 1) PR cannot protect from all pathogens; there will always be pathogens (along the lines of the vCJD prions) against which protection can be afforded only by a reduction in the number of donor exposures-from 4 or 5 for each adult therapeutic platelet dose to 1; and 2) apheresis platelets (compared with platelet pools) confer other (non-infectious, i.e., immunologic) benefits to transfusion recipients (Table 3) . Cardinal among these benefits is an expected reduction in the risk of TRALI with apheresis platelets (collected solely from male donors and screened female donors) versus pools [3, 6, 7, 16, 17, 86] . The contribution of apheresis platelets to TRALI and TTI prevention is maximized when multicomponent apheresis is used and all components collected from the same multicomponentapheresis donation are reserved for transfusion to the same recipient [3, 86] . Hopefully, this will soon be the case when the clinical practice of transfusion medicine progresses from the currently-dominant, componentcentric paradigm of the 20 th century to the patient-centric paradigm of the 21 st century (Table 4) [3, 87] . To meet all of a patient's transfusion needs with at least 2-fold fewer allogeneic-donor exposures (thereby reducing both the infectious and immunologic risks of transfusion by at least 2-fold [3, 90] ), the patient-centric paradigm combines patient blood management for surgical patients with multicomponent apheresis for medical patients. The purpose of the patient-centric paradigm is to reduce the transfusion risk for all patients to the as-low-as-reasonable-achievable (ALARA) risk [3, 40, 90] . The level of transfusion risk that can be deemed "tolerable" in the 21 st century (when implementation of the patient-centric transfusion-medicine paradigm is logistically and financially feasible) is significantly lower than the level of risk that used to be deemed "tolerable" in the 20 th century (when the component-centric transfusion-medicine paradigm was imposed upon us by considerations of supply and cost). The contribution of apheresis platelets to TRALI and TTI prevention is further maximized in patients with hypoproliferative thrombocytopenia when low-dose platelet transfusions are given to maintain a platelet count of at least 10,000/µL. Compared with subjects randomized to receive 1 apheresis concentrate or a pool of 6 WBD concentrates (the median number of WBD concentrates in a US platelet pool at the time of the study [91] ), patients randomized to receive half an apheresis concentrate or a pool of 3 WBD concentrates in the PLADO RCT [92] received a lower total platelet dose (median of 9X10 11 versus 11X10 11 ; p = 0.002) and had a higher number of platelet transfusion events (median of 5 versus 3; p < 0.001).
When the patient-centric paradigm of the 21 st century is implemented, low-dose recipients of apheresis concentrates can thus be supported through the period of hypoproliferative thrombocytopenia with a median of 2.5 donor exposures compared with 18 donor exposures for recipients of pools of 6 WBD concentrates (5 transfusion events in which a total of 2.5 apheresis concentrates are administered in the former case versus 3 transfusion events in which a total of 3 pools of 6 WBD concentrates each are administered in the latter case). When platelet dosing is optimized in this manner [92] and the two halves of each apheresis concentrate are transfused to the same recipient in accordance with the principles of the patient-centric paradigm of clinical transfusion practice (Table 4) [3, 90] , the ratio of donor exposures in recipients of pooled versus single-donor platelets during the period of platelet transfusion support for hypoproliferative thrombocytopenia is 18 to 2.5, or 7.2. The ratio of donor exposures (7.2) in this population of platelet transfusion recipients is thus considerably higher than the ratio of 4 (assumed by the German investigators 1 ) or the ratio of 5 (depicted in the middle section of Figure 1 and used in most calculations presented in this article). Thus, when we consider what an all-apheresis platelet supply can do for patients in the context of the patient-centric paradigm of the 21 st century [3, 87, 90] , both the estimate of the number of HIV, HCV, and HBV transmissions predicted by the RKI/PEI model 1 (1 to 2 transmissions annually because platelet pools have not been replaced by an all-apheresis platelet supply in Germany), and the estimate of the number of transmissions of the next major "HIV-like" pathogen to emerge in the future (88 transmissions in the year preceding the implementation of blood-donor screening owing to the continued use of platelet pools in Germany), should be adjusted upward to reflect the 7.2 (rather than 4 or 5) ratio of donor exposures in recipients of pooled versus single-donor platelets (i.e., the ratio that will pertain following the implementation of the patient-centric paradigm [3, 87, 90] ). In fact, the patient-centric paradigm for clinical transfusion practice [3, 87, 90] is especially relevant to Germany today, as Germany considers possible alternatives to implementing screening of all donations for WNV RNA in minipools [93] . No cases of WNV infection have been recorded in Germany and donor screening for WNV RNA is not currently performed. However, over the last 3 years (2010-2012), there have been hundreds of cases of WNV infection in European-Union countries (primarily Greece and Italy, but also as close to Germany as Hungary [94] ). It is possible that the equivalent of the 1999 (minor) WNV epidemic in New York State has already occurred in Europe (east and south of Germany in 2010-2012 [94] ), and that the equivalent of the 2002 (major) WNV epidemic in the US and Canadian plains remains to occur in Europe (including in Germany if the epidemic moves westward, as it did in 2002 in North America [95] ). As experience from North America has demonstrated [96] , owing to a low viral load dur-ing the infectious period of acute viremia, only individual or minipool testing of all donations for WNV RNA can protect recipients. Although PR of platelets and plasma would inactivate WNV (should such systems become appropriate for use outside the experimental setting), most recipients of platelets and plasma also receive red blood cells and there is currently no PR system for red blood cells. Furthermore, until there is a comprehensive system of PR that also encompasses red blood cells, which would permit various cost-savings from the possible discontinuation of other blood safety measures, the cost of PR is bound to be incremental and substantial [97] . The patient-centric paradigm for clinical transfusion practice can meet all of a patient's transfusion needs while reducing her/his donor exposures at least 2-fold through a combination of patient blood management and multicomponent apheresis [3, 90] . After patient blood management and multicomponent apheresis replace the current blood procurement system of wholeblood collections, the reduced number of components collected from allogeneic donors can be tested in minipools for WNV RNA in a precautionary manner (i.e., in anticipation of a future epidemic of WNV in Germany). A 4-week deferral of donors traveling to areas reporting WNV cases may serve as a stop-gap measure until minipool testing of all allogeneic donations is introduced. The risk of WNV transmission by transfusion in Western Europe can thus serve in a constructive manner by helping to reduce overall transfusion risk, rather than just the narrow risk of WNV transmission per se. Such will be the case if the effort to confront the risk of WNV transmission brings about changes facilitating the progression of clinical transfusion practice in Western Europe from the component-centric paradigm of the 20 th century to the patient-centric paradigm of the 21 st century. Several WNV cases of human disease had been reported already in 2008-2009 in northeastern Italy [98, 99] . In 2011, 2 new WNV genome sequences from human cases of WNV infection were described. The novel WNV genomes had high nucleotide and aminoacid sequence divergence from each other and from the WNV strain circulating in Italy in 2008-2009 [100] . The presence of different WNV strains in a relatively small geographic area is a novel finding that raises the possibility of new WNV strains emerging in the future, which-if mutations occur in the RNA regions targeted by the screening assays-may be undetectable by standard blood-donor screening assays [52] . Although others may advance this possibility as an argument for the introduction of PR of platelets, we sound (once more) the cautionary note that PR for platelets is not ready for implementation [82] , while there currently exists no PR system for red blood cells. Therefore, just like the possibility of novel pathogens, the possibility of new viral strains of HIV [52] and WNV [100] is, first and foremost, a reason for reducing donor exposures through widespread implementation of patient blood management and multicomponent apheresis. In conclusion, since PR is not ready for implementation, the risk of platelet pools differs (and will differ) sufficiently from the risk of single-donor (apheresis) platelets to mandate a revision of the German guidelines for hemotherapy [13] to indicate the difference in risk between these two components; as well as necessitate a planned transition toward an all-apheresis platelet supply. If the safety of PR is established in the future, PR should be performed on an all-apheresis platelet supply to maximize safety; not on the current platelet pools.
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